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WHAT OATHS MEANT TO THE FRAMERS‘ 
GENERATION: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH 
Steve Sheppard* 
Oaths of office are required by the second and sixth 
articles of the United States Constitution.  Article Two 
requires the President, before entering on the Execution of the 
office to ―take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‗I do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of 
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of 
the United States.‘‖1  Article Six requires that the legislators, 
executive and judicial officers, ―both of the United States and 
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution.‖2  The latter requirement is 
followed by what is now called the Religious Tests Clause, ―but 
no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States.‖3 
The first Congress passed implementing legislation for 
Article Six, establishing the oath that is essentially still 
administered to federal officials: ―I, A. B., do solemnly swear 
or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the 
Constitution of the United States.‖4  That oath was 
subsequently amended, in 1862 to account for war-time 
loyalties by requiring the Ironclad Test Oath, a specific oath of 
continuous loyalty, and in 1873 to remove that test, creating 
in 1884 the requirement that persists.5  The oath required 
 
 * Steve Sheppard is Judge William Enfield Professor of Law in the University of 
Arkansas.  Among his works is I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009). 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 2 Id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 3 Id. 
 4 An Act to regulate the Time and Manner of administering certain Oaths,  ch. 1, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 23, 23 (1789). 
 5 For a summary history of the oath, see United States Senate: Oath of Office, 
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today is this: 
I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support 
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith 
and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation 
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me 
God.6 
The oath for judges, however, has been a bit different 
from the very beginning.  Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which was (obviously) adopted by the same Congress that had 
enacted such a minimal oath for legislative and executive 
officers, the judicial officers have had broader and more 
specific obligations, which ―before they proceed to execute the 
duties of their respective offices,‖ must be expressed when 
each ―shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit:‖ 
I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer 
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the 
poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and 
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent 
on me as [judge/justice], according to the best of my abilities 
and understanding, agreeably to7 the constitution and laws 
of the United States.  So help me God.8 
Recent discussion in this journal has again raised the 
perennial questions of the role of the oaths, and the degree to 
which the oaths signal some religious commitment by the 
Framers, or whether one can see in them any expectation for a 
religious leadership of the nation.  The general position of 
Geoffrey Stone is that the Constitution enshrines no 
significant religious expectations.9  The criticism of historian 
Seth Tillman is that reading the whole of the text, the oaths 
clause and other provisions signal at least some reference to 
God, and the response of Robert Blomquist is to suggest that 
while this perhaps is true, it must be seen both in the wider 
context of the times, as well as understood with sensitivity to 
 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Oath_Office.htm (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
 6 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). 
 7 In the current iteration, a line is left here in lieu of ―my said office agreeably 
to,‖ and the person taking the oath is instructed to say either ―judge‖ or ―justice‖ and 
then says ―under‖ rather than ―agreeably to.‖  The other alteration made to the oath 
over the centuries has been to enclose ―or affirm‖ within parentheses. 
 8 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 453 (2006)). 
 9 Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (2008). 
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the changing contexts of American traditions and policy.10 
My enterprise is to sketch a bit more of the context that 
might help shed light on the meaning of these oaths, or at 
least some of the meanings of these oaths as they would have 
been understood by a person of the Framer‘s generation.  The 
enterprise here has two significant limits. 
First, to ascribe universal and specific meanings to 
something as complex as an oath would be unhelpful, as such 
meanings are, at best, matters of approximation and of 
averages among a variety of disparate views.  Individuals saw 
(and see) the world and any given thing in it from their own 
personal viewpoints, and these vary not only from person to 
person but even for one person as the person sees the matter 
differently over time.  Though some value might still be had 
by considering the idea of the oath in both the politics and 
societies that affected and reflected the colonial and early 
federal experience, it is important to see these not as 
representing the views of a single person. 
Second, a full discussion of the history of oaths in each 
colony—as matters of office, of testimony, of personal 
covenants, etc., arising in each of the European states from 
which the colonists came—is beyond the scope of this article 
and, anyway, not the purpose of the editors of de novo.  
Rather, I here raise a few points of reference, illustrating some 
of them with a few examples from British, colonial, and early 
federal history. 
Perhaps the most important suggestion I may make is 
that oaths harbor great paradox.  In a way, it seems as if the 
very nature of the oath is to contain and to manage competing 
influences—competing arguments—for the commitments that 
are to be made. 
 
 10 Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past History, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. 
DE NOVO 46, available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=106:tillman200946&catid=18:other-de-novo-articles 
&Itemid=20 (abridged version); Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past 
Historical Fact and Fiction: A Response to Professor Geoffrey R. Stone‘s Melville B. 
Nimmer Memorial Lecture and Essay, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 391 (forthcoming 2009), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1333576 (unabridged version); Robert F. 
Blomquist, Beyond Historical Blushing: A Plea for Constitutional Intelligence, 2009 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 244, available at 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=5&Itemid=24. 
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I.     THE OATH IS A PERSONAL OBLIGATION, 
BUT THE OATH IS A  PUBLIC OBLIGATION 
 
The oath, by definition, is created by a public institution, 
indeed drafted by officials of those institutions, but it must be 
taken personally by the individual, who is required to perform 
the office with particular care and (sometimes impliedly and 
sometimes explicitly) for the benefit of the public.  This duality 
in inherent in the ―subscription‖ by which a person takes an 
oath, and the ―office‖ that requires the oath itself. 
The public nature of the oath is reflected in the customs of 
its administration.  Oaths must be administered by a person 
appropriate to the task; an oath cannot be taken alone.  And, 
the very language by which people talk of ―making‖ or ―taking‖ 
an oath in the context of these oaths is different from the 
usual language of ―utterance‖ of an oath, in that there is 
always the institutional predicate of the creation of the form of 
the oath, and there is always the official predicate of 
administration.  An official presents the oath in a form 
repeated by its taker, and the officials tend to be jealous of the 
monopoly of institutions of law in creating this form, seeing 
this consolidation of power as a benefit to the citizen.  Thus, 
one of the Liberties of colonial Massachusetts reserved to the 
Assembly the power to prescribe the forms of oaths.11 
Yet the oath is a personal, solemn undertaking.  As 
Joseph Story described it, the oath is an act of conscience in 
which the person must make an inner acceptance of the 
proffered, institutional obligation.12 
 
 11 The Liberty No. 3 of the Liberties of Massachusetts, 1641, provided: 
It is ordered and decreed, and by this Court declared; that no man shall be 
urged to take any oath, or subscribe any Articles, Covenants, or 
remonstrance of publick and civil nature but such as the General Court 
hath considered, allowed and required.  And that no oath of Magistrate, 
Counceller or any other Officer shall binde him any farther, or longer then 
he is resident, or reputed an Inhabitant of this Jurisdictiõ [1641] 
THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 43 (Huntington Library, rev. ed. 
1998) (1648) (presenting a type facsimile of THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND 
LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSSETS (1648)). 
 12 In his commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story wrote: 
That all those, who are entrusted with the execution of the powers of the 
national government, should be bound by some solemn obligation to the 
due execution of the trusts reposed in them, and to support the 
constitution, would seem to be a proposition too clear to render any 
reasoning necessary in support of it. It results from the plain right of 
society to require some guaranty from every officer, that he will be 
conscientious in the discharge of his duty. Oaths have a solemn obligation 
upon the minds of all reflecting men, and especially upon those, who feel a 
deep sense of accountability to a Supreme being. 
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1838 (1833), available at 
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Oaths mattered a great deal to the people of this age.  
They were well aware of the commitments that oaths 
demanded, and they spent great effort to craft oaths.  
Massachusetts colonists, for instance, had thirty-two different 
oaths for different offices.13  The significance went far beyond 
the specificities of duty, however.  English (and colonial) 
arguments over nation, identity, and religion were manifest in 
many arguments centering on oaths, one illustration among 
many being the Scots uprising of the Solemn League and 
Covenant of 1643,14 echoed in Boston in 177415 and 
memorialized by Burns in 1795.16   
 
II.     THE OATH IS THE SOURCE OF OBLIGATION, BUT THE 
OBLIGATION OF OFFICE EXISTS INDEPENDENTLY 
 
The oaths of office, by their terms, refer not only to 
existing obligations but incorporate obligations of a variety of 
forms that arise from the office itself, building them into the 
commitment expressed by the oath.  Thus, even the oath to 
―support the Constitution of the United States‖ is an 
acceptance of an obligation that one would reasonably infer 
from reading the Constitution itself.  Having accepted the 
office, to later promise ―to perform the duties of my office‖ or 
even to then promise to perform ―all the duties incumbent on 
me as [judge/justice]‖ is—to a degree—redundant. 
In every instance, the acceptance of an office and the 
nature of the office imply a set of obligations, not the least 
 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a6_3s27.html. 
 13 See the inventory of the Massachusetts Lawes and Liberties in STEVE 
SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS 
267 (2009). 
 14 See, e.g., Edward Vallance, ‘An Holy and Sacramentall Paction’: Federal 
Theology and the Solemn League and Covenant in England, 116 ENG. HIST. REV. 50 
(2001). 
 15 For the influence of the Scots oaths and league on revolutionaries in America 
in the 1770‘s see 12 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 42 
(1871). 
 16 Burns wrote: 
The Solemn League and Covenant, 
Cost Scotland blood—cost Scotland tears, 
But it sealed Freedom‘s sacred cause, 
If thou‘rt a slave, indulge thy sneer. 
2 ROBERT BURNS, Solemn League and Covenant, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT BURNS 
446 (William Ernest Henley & Thomas F. Henderson eds., 1897).  Some renditions 
read these middle lines, ―Now brings a smile, now brings a tear; But sacred 
Freedom, too, was theirs:‖. 
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being to perform that office according to its purpose and for 
the benefit of those whom the office is created to serve.  That 
an oath requires such a function be performed is a bit 
superfluous.  Writing just before American independence, Sir 
William Blackstone, interpreting the earlier work of Sir 
Edward Coke, recognized this inherent duplication in oaths of 
allegiance, the oath serving only to add a civil sanction of 
perjury to the moral sanctions of disloyalty, and adding a 
religious commitment to the prior social commitment.17 
 
III.     THE FORM OF THE OATH CREATES SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS 
AMIDST VERY GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
The institutions create the offices and also determine 
which oaths shall be required of those who take them.  This 
monopoly by which to specify the form of the oath to be taken 
by the official was taken very seriously.  Not only do we see 
this in the difference in the form of oath given to judges as 
opposed to other officers, but also we see it in the many forms 
of oath required in the colonies and the states.  This point is 
essential in understanding the oaths themselves, particularly 
when they are written as broadly as the presidential oath.  For 
instance, the oath of the judges of Virginia was sufficient not 
only for Chancellor George Wythe to find he may not evade a 
question before him, that he must apply his skill and learning 
to the question, and, applying that skill, that he must abide by 
the state‘s constitution to such a degree as to void an 
unconstitutional act by the state‘s legislature.18 
The specificity of oaths appears to have been important to 
the drafters of oaths, who required sometimes quite specific 
undertakings unique to certain roles, such as the 
 
 17 In his discussion of ―People, Whether Aliens, Denizens or Natives,‖ Blackstone 
wrote: 
The formal profession therefore, or oath of subjection, is nothing more than 
a declaration in words of what was before implied in law.  . . . The sanction 
of an oath, it is true, in case of violation of duty, makes the guilt still more 
accumulated, by superadding perjury to treason; but it does not encrease 
the civil obligation to loyalty; it only strengthens the social tie by uniting it 
with that of religion. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357. 
 18 Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (Sup. Ct. App. 1782) (Wythe, C.) (―I 
approach the question which has been submitted to us: and, although, it was said 
the other day, by one of the judges, that, imitating that great and good man lord 
Hale, he would sooner quit the bench than determine it, I feel no alarm; but will 
meet the crisis as I ought; and, in the language of my oath of office, will decide it, 
according to the best of my skill and judgment.‖). 
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requirements of assistant census takers.19  Yet the oaths were 
also prone to use terms understood to hold great generality 
and duty, such as ―just‖ and ―perfect.‖  The simplicity of the 
oath required of the President turns, in part, on the breadth of 
the duties it prescribes: to execute the office, and to ―preserve, 
protect, and defend‖ the Constitution.  Thus, the judge is 
specifically charged to favor neither the rich nor the poor but 
more generally to ―do justice.‖ 
 
IV.     THE OATH TRADES ON A RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT, BUT THE 
OBLIGATION DOES NOT DEPEND ON GOD 
 
The oath is, by customary understanding, an undertaking 
made according to a commitment to God.  This implied 
invocation of God in most oaths distinguishes it from an 
affirmation, in which there is no expressed or implied 
invocation of God‘s name, although there remained an 
understanding that the obligation was a solemn obligation 
that would be immoral to breach. 
That said, it is a mistake to think of the affirmation as 
God-less.  Rather an affirmation was made patently without 
reference to God in order to allow the devout Quakers or 
others—whose fear of God would not allow a reference to God‘s 
name in any other undertaking than one fit for religious 
observance—to enter the commitments of the oath none the 
less.  The undertaking remained quite clearly one in which 
violating one‘s word would be a serious act, as a statement in 
perjury.  But the very nature of the prohibition on the 
swearing of oaths being religious, the areligious nature of the 
affirmation was seen as acceptable to those who sought a 
religious basis for such undertakings. 
This differed from concerns for those who took oaths 
without such scruples. Thus, Massachusetts, and indeed most 
states, allowed Quakers to avoid swearing oaths but to affirm 
obligations under the threat of perjury.20  More, affirmations 
 
 19 Congress required the assistant to the district marshall to swear: 
I, A. B. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will make a just and perfect 
enumeration and description of all persons resident within the division 
assigned to me by the marshal of the district of [district name] and make 
due return thereof to the said marshal, agreeably to the directions of an act 
of Congress, intituled ‗An act providing for the enumeration of the 
inhabitants of the United States,‘ according to the best of my ability. 
Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 101 (1790) (providing for the ―enumeration of the 
Inhabitants of the United States‖). 
 20 See MASS. CONST. amend. VI. 
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were only available for Quakers or others whose objection to 
an oath was religious.21  There was no thought that the 
Quakers were the heretics whom St. George Tucker feared 
when he scored atheists and Papists who might take oaths.22 
Even so, it is a mistake to think that the Founding 
generation saw the oath as a thoroughly religious 
commitment.  Indeed, Blackstone saw the Oath as a way of 
bringing religion to bear in enforcing an independent 
obligation, arising from the acceptance of office, not from the 
oath itself.23 
In many instances, the nature of the oath, and the 
obligations of it, were seen as effectively secular, and 
whatever religious trappings the oath brought were simply 
overlooked.  Thus, when the oath of allegiance was taken by 
the executive and legislative officers, no reference to God was 
expected (in part, no doubt, owing to respect for the Religious 
Tests Clause).  Whatever implied notion of religious 
significance in the oath is there was seen generally as an 
option, like the presidential oath, in which ―So help me God‖ 
was added by the president-elect to the constitutionally 
required text, a practice that became a common custom.24 
Indeed, in one of the more famous expositions of the 
judicial oath, which does have a required statement of 
invocation to God, Chief Justice John Marshall did not feel 
compelled to quote the reference to God at all.  In Marbury v. 
Madison, Marshall relied on his obligation under his oath, 
which he quoted in full, but for the last lines and their 
reference to God.  These, he omitted.25 
 
 21 State v. Putnam, 1 N.J.L. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1794) (―The exception was, that it 
appeared to be taken ‗on the oaths or affirmations‘ of A, B, C, &c., without setting 
forth that they are quakers or conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath. A case of 
The State v. Cook, in Middlesex, was cited, in which this error had been held fatal.‖). 
 22 ―Atheism destroys the sacredness and obligation of an oath. But is there not 
also a religion (so called) which does this, by teaching, that there is power which can 
dispense with the obligation of oaths; that pious frauds are right, and that faith is 
not to be kept with heretics.‖  2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE‘S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE app. 3–11 (Philadelphia, 1803); see 
also 1 TUCKER, supra, at app. 267-97.  This hyperbolic fear of Catholics contrasts 
with the acceptance of Quakers. 
 23 See supra note 13. 
 24 President Washington chose to add the phrase in taking his own oath, and the 
custom has been continued as a matter of the choice of many, but not, all Presidents.  
See Inauguration of the President: George Washington, http://inaugural.senate.gov/ 
history/chronology/gwashington1789.cfm. 
 25 Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
 The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely 
demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject.  It is in these 
words, ―I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to 
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will 
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We can, quite safely I think, read the Constitutional text 
and its commitment to oaths without believing that the oath 
signaled a requirement of a religious pledge or a God-fearing 
basis for acceptance of the oath.  The Oaths of Office Clause is 
immediately followed by the Religious Tests Clause.  The 
Framers could hardly have more clearly signaled that an oath, 
whatever religious significance it has for its taker, is not 
required to assure the taker‘s religion. 
 
V.     THE OATH OFFICIALS DRAFTED COMMITS A PERSON TO 
SUPPORT A STATE, BUT THE OATH DOES NOT COMMIT TO SUPPORT 
ITS OFFICIALS 
 
The oaths required by the Constitution differ markedly 
from their great antecedents, the oaths of allegiance.  These 
oaths, given by lords and officials on taking office, were 
declarations of fealty to the monarch, a personal commitment 
to the person of the king.  True, the monarch accepted such 
fealty in the official role of the kingship, in a division of the 
king‘s person between the official and the personal, but in 
practice the division was less than clear, when for instance, 
new oaths were made for the new monarch. 
The personal aspect of the commitment had long ago 
begun to break down.  Sir Edward Coke, for instance, believed 
that his commitment to the king and to the law as a judge 
transcended mere obedience to the monarch‘s whim.26  The 
oaths as written in the Constitution and then by the first 
Congress reflect this impersonal, institutional view of office, 
the oaths being written to commit the oath-taker to abstract 
principles, rather than to a President, or to the Congress, or 
other personal authorities. 
 
 
faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as 
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the 
constitution, and laws of the United States.‖ 
 Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the 
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his 
government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
 26 See Steve Sheppard, Introduction to 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
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VI.     THE OATH IS A MATTER OF PERSONAL COMPLIANCE, BUT 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF LAW ENFORCE OATHS 
 
As Blackstone says, an oath adds the threat of perjury to 
the stated obligation.  This idea of the enforcement of the oath 
is more commonly encountered in the early federal court in 
adjudicating the claims arising from the false statement of a 
witness or a claimant.27  Yet, the possibility of enforcement by 
institutions is proved by even this limited use. 
 
VII.     THE OATH IS A PRESENT PROMISE, BUT IT ACCEPTS A 
COMMITMENT OF FUTURE SACRIFICE 
 
The promises made in the oath are a precondition on the 
entry into an office, and the effects of the promise last as long 
as the oath-taker remains in office.  The expectation is that 
the oath binds the official from the moment it is made, and its 
effects will persist, regardless of the challenges that the oath-
taker might face—whether in obstacles to performance or 
lures toward corruption in that performance, and whether 
those obstacles could be known or would be unknown at the 
time of the oath. 
 
EPILOGUE.     THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF RELIGION 
 
The argument raised by Mr. Tillman in this journal is 
that the Oath of Office Clause, at least indirectly, is a 
constitutional reference to God.  This is probably true.  Yet the 
more general point made by Prof. Stone is that the 
Constitution‘s specific rejection of Holy Writ as the foundation 
of the state and the obligations of its officials is quite different 
from great declarations of state in the colonial experience, for 
instance the earlier instruments to govern Massachusetts.  
This also is true. 
It appears that the common-law understanding of the 
oath was to require an avowedly moral commitment, not 
merely a legal commitment, while at the same time creating a 
legally enforceable duty.  Certainly, some oaths were written 
with the invocation to God, yet many weren‘t, and the 
 
 27 See Rue v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 58 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1790). 
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differences between those that were and those that weren‘t 
seem quite arbitrary, and at least to John Marshall, 
irrelevant. 
More generally, there is no great reason to segregate 
religious or God-fearing bases of morality from other sources 
of morality, and even the most committed deist would have no 
objection to a requirement of right conduct that must be 
secured according to the moral notions of the oath-taker.  The 
constitutional structures of the oaths allowed great breadth 
and flexibility for such notions, and we know that in short 
order, the oaths were taken by Episcopalians, Presbyterians, 
Congregationalists, Jews, and Catholics, and quite a few 
deists. 
There are, indeed, other bases of morality underlying the 
oath required for a given constitutional office.  Not only the 
ancient notion that one must carry out one‘s promise, but also 
the complex arrangements one accepts when agreeing to act 
for others and the special obligations that arise from legal 
office—all of these combine to create particular obligations 
that transcend the legal descriptions of that office.  The oaths 
were structured and understood to incorporate these claims, 
as well as the claims of religion and of nation.  What mattered 
to the drafters of oaths and to the Framers was not so much a 
particular commitment from one moral source or another. 
What mattered was that there would be a solemn, personal 
commitment—individually made but publicly known and, if 
need be, publicly enforced—to use good faith and best efforts 
in the performance of the whole duty of the office and in the 
preservation of the Constitution. 
